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This paper demonstrates the hidden similarities between Raymond Chandler’s prototypical 
noir The Big Sleep, and the United Nations Responsibility to Protect (R2P) document. By taking 
up the work of philosopher Giorgio Agamben, this paper shows that the bare life produces the 
form of protection embodied by Philip Marlowe in Chandler’s novel and by the United Nations 
Security Council in R2P. Agamben’s theorizing of the extra-legal status of the sovereign 
pertains to both texts, in which the protector exists outside of the law. Philip Marlowe, tasked 
with preventing the distribution of pornographic images, commits breaking-and-entering, 
withholding evidence, and murder. Analogously, R2P advocates for the Security Council’s 
ability to trespass laws that safeguard national sovereignty in order to prevent “bare” 
atrocities against human life. As Agamben demonstrates, the extra-legal position of the 
protector is made possible by “stripping bare” human life. This paper also gestures towards 
limitations of Agamben’s thought by indicating, through a comparison of these two texts, that 
bare life produces states of exception as the object of protection rather than punishment. 
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As two texts whose primary concern is the suspension of law, Raymond Chandler‘s novel 
The Big Sleep can be thought alongside the United Nations The Responsibility to Protect 
document (R2P). This paper demonstrates that the prioritization of protection over legal 
representation in both of these texts emerges from the production of bareness. In The Big Sleep, 
Philip Marlowe is hired as an extra-legal investigator tasked with preventing the distribution of 
pornographic images. Similarly, the R2P document argues for the ability to suspend state 
sovereignty in order to protect human life that has been stripped of national character. In order to 
explain the hidden similarity between these two texts, this paper takes up the philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben‘s argument that the production of bare life facilitates the creation of states of exception 
in which sovereign violence can exceed legal limitations. By drawing on the logic of exception 
that underlies the strategies of protection that are represented in each document, this paper also 
points out possible reworkings of Agamben‘s thesis.  
Agamben argues that states of exception can occur through the production of bare life by 
the sovereign, which enables sovereign violence to be deployed without juridical limitations. 
Agamben explains that a state of exception is when the law is temporarily suspended by the state 
due to emergency circumstances. Citing 9/11 as a state of exception in his book Homo Sacer, 
Agamben points out that ―President Bush‘s decision to refer to himself constantly as the 
‗Commander in Chief of the Army‘ after September 11, 2001 . . . entails a direct reference to the 
state of exception . . . in which the emergency becomes the rule, and the very distinction between 
peace and war (and between foreign and civil war) becomes impossible‖ (22). Agamben explains 
that the ―emergency‖ of 9/11 permitted the US government to perform increasingly invasive and 
unconstitutional practices of protection, such as ―the USA Patriot Act issued by the U.S. Senate 
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on October 26, 2001, [that] allowed the attorney general to ‗take into custody‘ any alien 
suspected of activities that endangered ‗the national security of the United States‘‖ (Agamben 
State of Exception 3). Bare life enables this seemingly occasional state to become the rule, for the 
state of exception to become the norm. 
Hannah Arendt describes bare life as occurring ―when a person becomes a human being in 
general – without a profession, without citizenship, without an opinion, without a deed by which 
to identify and specify himself‖ (182). Agamben departs from Arendt‘s formulation of power by 
showing that ―the production of bare life is the originary activity of sovereignty‖ (Homo Sacer 
83). Bare life is not a product of power, as Arendt argues in The Origins of Totalitarianism, 
instead it constitutes the very foundation of sovereignty. Bare life is a mode of being that permits 
the sovereign to enact violence without constitutional restraint, ―sovereign violence is in truth 
founded not on a pact but on the exclusive inclusion of bare life in the state‖ (Homo Sacer 106). 
Bare life lacks political representation, yet it is subject to political forces – it is an inclusive 
exclusion of oikos in the workings of the polis, of the unpolitical being in the administration of 
power. The expression that Agamben uses for naming this formulation of bare life is homo sacer, 
they who can be killed without being murdered. During a state of exception, such as the one that 
Agamben links to the Patriot Acts, specific members of society become reduced to homo sacer 
when they are stripped of legal representation, left defenceless, utterly vulnerable to the state. 
States of exception thereby form a necessary component of sovereignty. It is during a state of 
exception that the necessary inclusive exclusion is produced, the scapegoat that is within the city 
but is not protected by its laws. This paper demonstrates that The Big Sleep as well as the R2P 
document expose the ways that bare life permits increasingly invasive and illegal forms of 
sovereign power, but through reversing Agamben‘s logic, whereby bare life becomes that which 
must be protected instead of expelled.  
In Raymond Chandler‘s prototypical noir, Philip Marlowe is hired by General Sternwood 
to ―handle‖ the extortion efforts being made by Arthur Gwynn Geiger, who has been 
blackmailing General Sternwood with gambling debts accrued by his daughter. Marlowe proves 
to be the ideal man for this assignment because of his ability to ensure privacy and to work 
outside the law. Through several acts of trespassing and deceit, Marlowe eventually uncovers 
Geiger‘s pornography studio: ―Miss Carmen Sternwood was sitting in a fringed orange shawl…it 
had a profile like an eagle and its wide round eye was a camera lens. The lens was aimed at the 
naked girl in the chair‖ (Chandler 36). Marlowe eventually tracks down the photographs to Joe 
Brody and retrieves them by blackmailing Joe into releasing them, stating ―You knew she was 
there, because you had your girl friend threaten Mrs. Regan with a police rap. The only ways you 
could know enough to do that would be by seeing what happened or by holding the photo and 
knowing where and when it was taken. Cough up and be sensible.‖ (83) Marlowe‘s shady 
approach, his playing loose with the law, is what makes him the ideal protector. In a conversation 
with Carmen‘s sister Vivian, Marlowe reminds her how valuable he is, not simply because of his 
confidentiality: ―‗How about telling the police?‘ ‗It‘s a good idea. But you won‘t do it.‘ ‗Won‘t 
I?‘ ‗No. You have to protect your father and your sister. You don‘t know what the police might 
turn up. It might be something they couldn‘t sit on‘‖ (59). The appropriateness of Marlowe‘s 
methods is rationalized by what he has been hired to protect: photographs of Carmen‘s bare, 
entirely uncovered body. 
The United Nations document, The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) argues that the 
sovereignty of individual nations can be suspended in order to prevent ―bare‖ atrocities against 
humanity. This marks a significant shift in international relations, since it prioritizes the 
protection of human beings regardless of nationality, race, or religion – in other words, human 
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beings that have been stripped of any qualities. This is supported by the document‘s rhetoric of 
―bareness.‖ For example, article 1.5 argues that disagreements between state leaders over the 
permissibility of intervention have ―laid bare basic divisions within the international 
community,‖ and concludes by stating, ―in the interest of all those victims who suffer and die 
when leadership and institutions fail, it is crucial that these divisions be resolved‖ (2). In 
describing past atrocities, R2P emphasizes how situations like ―Rwanda in 1994 laid bare the full 
horror of inaction‖ (1). What is ―stripped away‖ by these events is their national specificity, since 
―in the aftermath, many African peoples concluded that, for all the rhetoric about the universality 
of human rights, some human lives end up mattering a great deal less to the international 
community than others‖ (R2P 1). The ―bareness‖ of these atrocities is what makes them 
―conscience-shocking situation[s] crying out for action‖ (R2P 55). This paper makes two claims: 
that the R2P document produces ―bare life‖ by reversing Agamben‘s formulation, and that the 
R2P document argues for a strategy of protection that exploits bare life in order to violate 
individual state sovereignty. 
By placing Marlowe alongside the R2P document, a correlation emerges which shows 
that the R2P document operates according to a logic that can only be called pornographic. By 
―laying bare‖ our responsibilities, the R2P document argues that atrocities such as genocide have 
made the issue of preventing these crises the obligation of the international community. Since the 
prevention of these atrocities is no longer solely the concern for the nation in which it occurs, this 
responsibility justifies the violation of laws that protect state sovereignty. When the R2P 
document states ―the [Security] Council is already prepared to authorize coercive deployments in 
cases where the crisis in question is, for all practical purposes, confined within the borders of a 
particular state‖ (34), this authorization depends on the degree to which the crisis is an obligation 
to the international community. In other words, this depends on how ―bare‖ the crisis is – how 
much it lacks national specificity, to what degree it is a concern about ―human life‖ regardless of 
what national, cultural, or religious qualities it may possess. Similarly, Marlowe‘s protection of 
Carmen‘s nudity involves having to work outside of legal limitations. His methods include 
blackmail, breaking and entering, withholding evidence, and murder. During a conversation with 
the District Attorney, Marlowe states, ―my client is entitled to that protection, short of anything 
but a Grand Jury. I have a license to operate as a private detective. I suppose that word ‗private‘ 
has some meaning‖ (Chandler 111-12). For Marlowe, a ―private‖ investigator is one who is not 
beholden to the public, with all of its rules and regulations. The way that R2P advocates for the 
protection of human life, and Marlowe protects Carmen‘s nude photos, corresponds with 
Agamben‘s formulation of sovereign power as that which operates outside of juridical 
limitations. In both cases, this is enacted by the production of bare life, but in a reversal of 
Agamben‘s logic, since bare life becomes that which is protected rather than expelled. 
In his article, ―‗You‘re a Watcher, Lad‘: Detective Fiction, Pornography, and Ellroy‘s 
L.A. Quartet,‖ Jim Mancall argues that pornography is frequently found in detective fiction 
because crime and pornography both need to be restrained. He states that ―crime can never be 
completely eradicated, but it can be carefully controlled and confined‖ (3). Likewise, 
―containment is a fixture in debates about the regulation of pornography‖ (3), which makes 
―pornography . . . a signifier for the detective story itself‖ (12). This can be seen in The Big Sleep 
by considering how Carmen‘s pornography exceeds confinement. Marlowe discovers that 
pornography is being distributed through secret deposits on the street, ―I watched him out of sight 
and went up the central walk of the La Baba and parted the branches of the third cypress. I drew 
out a wrapped book and put it under my arm and went away from there‖ (Chandler 27), ―a racket 
like that, out in the open on the boulevard, seemed to mean a lot of protection‖ (30). 
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The conspicuousness of the pornography ring, contrasted with the images of Carmen that are 
taken in a ―wide room, the whole width of the house . . . there were four cushions, bits of odd silk 
tossed around, as if whoever lived there had to have a piece he could reach and thumb‖ (34-35) 
emphasizes how pornography disrupts confinement. Marlowe is specially equipped to protect an 
object like pornography because he is also capable of breaking spatial limits. In the chapter ―The 
Synoptic Chandler‖ from Shades of Noir, Fredric Jameson states that the various ―offices‖ in 
Chandler‘s novels ―are able in a satisfactory and satisfying manner to span the breadth of the 
social system from wealth to poverty and (in the area of crime and vice) from public to private‖ 
(44-45). He goes on to argue that the structure of The Big Sleep ―organizes people and their 
dwellings into a cognitive map of Los Angeles that Marlowe can be seen to canvass, pushing the 
doorbells of so many social types, from the great mansions to the junk-filled rooms on Bunker 
Hill or West 54
th
 Place‖ (53). Marlowe‘s Los Angeles is an area without limits, and his ability to 
trespass borders is appropriate for securing an object like pornography that also resists 
containment.  
Various passages in the R2P document state that violations against human life constitute a 
threat that supersedes national borders, ―the Commission believes that they will strictly limit the 
use of coercive military force for human protection purposes . . . in those exceptional 
circumstances when violence within a state menaces all peoples‖ (35). ―Human protection‖ is an 
international, rather than domestic, responsibility. R2P thereby advocates a method of protection 
that is capable of trespassing national limits, even arguing that it is the obligation of the 
international community to intervene during ―a breakdown or abdication of a state‘s own capacity 
and authority in discharging its ‗responsibility to protect‘‖ (39). Not only are all nations 
responsible for protecting human life, but all nations are obliged to intervene when human life is 
threatened. R2P does not simply argue for the permissibility of violations of sovereignty, it 
advocates a radically deterritorialized model of international relations. 
The objects of protection in both of these texts challenge territorial separations: the nude 
photographs of Carmen are private images made public, and in R2P, human life belongs to the 
citizens of a specific country but are also of international concern. The insistent assurance that 
―when the call goes out to the community of states for action, that call will be answered . . . there 
must be no more Rwandas‖ (R2P 70) continues to draw attention to the pornographic aspect of 
these crises within the framework of protection advocated by R2P, as private affairs that are 
made public. Because the responsibility to protect human life is both domestic and international, 
R2P argues that the means for protecting it should likewise cross over these territorial 
distinctions. These means are reflected by the topographical subversion of sovereignty that 
Agamben discusses in Homo Sacer. Agamben describes the sovereign as existing both within and 
outside the juridical order, ―the sovereign, having the legal power to suspend the validity of the 
law, legally places himself outside the law‖ (Homo Sacer 15). This inclusive exclusionary status 
is made permissible by the production of bare life, which is the included exclusion to the city. 
Agamben states that ―in the city, the banishment of sacred life is more internal than every 
interiority and more external than every extraneousness‖ (Homo Sacer 111). It comes from 
without, but it is within, thus granting the sovereign the ability to punish homo sacer without 
respecting the rules of the city. Bare life also collapses the separation of private and public 
spheres because of its necessarily biopolitical aspect. Biopolitical life is produced when the 
traditional distinctions of bios and zoē, or of political life and private life, have been joined,  
together with the process by which exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare 
life – which is originally situated at the margins of the political order – gradually begins to 
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coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoē, 
right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction. (Homo Sacer 9) 
If we consider how Agamben‘s argument may be reversed, then the protection (rather than the 
punishment) of bare life as a category that subverts topographical separation explains the 
extensions of sovereignty occurring in The Big Sleep and R2P. Just as the protection of Carmen‘s 
nudity requires somebody who is capable of trespassing, so does R2P advocate for a method of 
protection that rejects national borders. The dissolution of territorial demarcation in The Big 
Sleep and R2P can be explained by considering how the object of protection works against these 
limitations in virtue of its bareness. 
Marlowe protects Carmen‘s body in several respects. To begin with, his destruction of the 
pornographic photographs is an act that protects the use of her body against her consent. Elaine 
Scarry discusses the relationship between consent and the body in her book Thermonuclear 
Monarchy, wherein she states, ―what we call a ‗constitutional principle of authorization‘ 
embedded in a legal document, and ‗social contract‘ when embedded in a philosophic document, 
we call ‗consent‘ when embodied in a living human being‖ (263). By referring to the influence of 
medical discourse on John Locke and John Stuart Mill, Scarry argues that ―the body is 
inseparable from the deep structure of consent‖ (275), forming ―the lever across which 
sovereignty is gained, authorization achieved‖ (276). The relationship between the body and 
consent is key for understanding the kind of violation that is produced by Carmen‘s pornographic 
photographs. By working to prevent the nonconsensual distribution of her pornographic images, 
Marlowe‘s first assignment is the protection of her body. Throughout this investigation, Marlowe 
also protects Carmen from physical harm: ―Agnes turned the gun away from me and swung it at 
Carmen. I shot my hand out and closed my fingers down hard over her hand and jammed my 
thumb on the safety catch‖ (Chandler 86). Yet despite the fact that Carmen‘s body is an object 
that requires protection, it is revealed by the end of the novel that Carmen is the true threat. 
Marlowe explains how Carmen attempts to murder him for refusing to consent to her sexual 
advances, ―she was in my bed – naked. I threw her out on her ear. I guess maybe Regan did the 
same thing to her sometime. But you can‘t do that to Carmen‖ (227). As for Rusty Regan, ―she 
turned the gun and shot him, just the way she tried to shoot me today, and for the same reason‖ 
(226). Referring to Scarry‘s statements on consent, Carmen‘s behaviour represents a fundamental 
violation of bodily respect. Despite the fact that Marlowe is hired to protect Carmen, Marlowe 
has to protect himself from Carmen. Carmen is paradoxically both vulnerable and dangerous, and 
although Marlowe is employed to protect her body, she herself constitutes a threat of bodily harm 
and violation. 
The UN Security Council can be thought through a similar paradox: of representing a 
body that must be protected while also being capable of violating sovereignty. Judith Butler 
argues in Precarious Life that ―the body implies mortality, vulnerability, agency: the skin and the 
flesh expose us to the gaze of others, but also to touch, and to violence, and bodies put us at risk 
of becoming the agency and instrument of all these as well‖ (26). Considering the ways in which 
R2P responds to the vulnerability of human life, the use of bodily rhetoric demonstrates how the 
representation of human life by ―international or regional bodies‖ (R2P 31) and ―non-
governmental bodies‖ (R2P 42) suggests that these organizations are vulnerable in a specific, 
corporeal way. This is evidenced by the defensive rhetoric that is employed in R2P for protecting 
the legitimacy of these bodies, reflecting the concern ―that intervention for human protection 
purposes, including military intervention in extreme cases, is supportable‖ (R2P 16). R2P 
explicitly calls on the need to defend the Security Council from any objections, stating that ―there 
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is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to authorize 
military intervention for human protection purposes‖ (XII). For these reasons, organizations such 
as the UN Security Council are appropriately called ―bodies‖ because they represent vulnerable 
bare life and are themselves vulnerable. In her dissertation ―The Body of International Relations,‖ 
Lauren B. Wilcox builds on Butler‘s analysis of the body‘s vulnerability by showing that the R2P 
approach towards security regards ―the body of security [as] an exogenous, natural body that is 
free to go about its business in the absence of violence. By reproducing the sovereign state, R2P 
reproduces this ‗natural‘ body‖ (247). Wilcox‘s argument points out how the rhetoric of R2P 
emphasizes the vulnerability of international security itself. Yet despite the vulnerability of R2P 
and its associated international bodies, they are also capable of violence. This is evidenced in 
Section 4 of R2P, ―The Responsibility to React,‖ which emphasizes the capability of the United 
Nations for launching aggressive action. Not only does this section convey the UN‘s military 
capability, it also draws attention to the UN‘s ability to transgress rules of sovereignty. The 
international ―bodies‖ that protect bare life while nevertheless demanding to be protected, are 
paradoxically also the agents capable of violating international contracts of state independence. 
Considering the connection that Scarry outlines between bodies and consent, these organizations 
function like bodies that demand for their consent to be protected while also violating the consent 
of others. 
Carmen and the UN Security Council are bodies that paradoxically require protection 
while acting as aggressive agents. Carmen‘s body is an object of protection, but Carmen also 
violates bodily rights of consent. The international bodies specified in R2P are objects of 
protection that are also responsible for protecting, while within the R2P document they 
nevertheless represent a force that can violate rules of state sovereignty. This paradox can be 
understood by considering the dual ways in which bodies are ―stripped.‖ On the one hand, a body 
can be thought in terms of a bare life that lacks representation (political ―clothing‖), while on the 
other hand a body is one without insignia, without a uniform, and without the obligations that 
come with this apparel. Agamben describes both of these situations of bareness as homo sacer 
and the sovereign respectively. Both of these paradigms for power exist outside of a juridical 
order of representation, which permits the sovereign the ability to exercise greater control over 
homo sacer. According to Agamben, sovereign power arises from the inclusion of a pre-
representational and pre-contractual State of War within a State of Society,  
it is important to note that in Hobbes the state of nature survives in the person of the sovereign . 
. . sovereignty thus presents itself as an incorporation of the state of nature in society, or, if one 
prefers, as a state of indistinction between nature and culture, between violence and law, and 
this very indistinction constitutes specifically sovereign violence. (Homo Sacer 34) 
This included exception is exhibited in the production of states of exception and bare life, which 
facilitate the suspension of contractual protection that comprises a State of Society. Because of 
this inclusion, Agamben describes the sovereign as appearing like a wolf-man, ―when Hobbes 
founds sovereignty by means of a reference to the state in which ‗man is a wolf to men,‘. . . at 
issue is not simply feria bestia and natural life but rather a zone of indistinction between the 
human and animal, a werewolf‖ (Homo Sacer 106). Marlowe even remarks that Carmen appears 
like a dog as she is rolling on the floor, ―Carmen was crawling on her hands and knees, still 
hissing . . . ‗Get up, angel. You look like a Pekinese,‘‖ (Chandler 87) adding to the irony that 
Carmen is in fact a murderer. Likewise, the fact that ―there is no better or more appropriate body 
than the United Nations Security Council to authorize military intervention,‖ a ―body‖ that 
consists of ―unrepresentative membership . . . and its inherent double standards with the 
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Permanent Five veto power‖ (R2P 49), brings to mind Agamben‘s formulation of the sovereign 
as an included exception to representation that administers the law without being beholden to it. 
The bareness of Carmen‘s body makes her vulnerable, but also excepts her from having to 
respect rules of consent, while the international bodies of R2P require protection from its critics 
even as the document advocates for their ability to violate state sovereignty. 
Marlowe is the permanently clothed figure who refuses to be reduced to bare life. The 
protection of Carmen‘s body permits exceptions to the law, the distorting of private and public 
spheres, and excepts Carmen herself from having to respect the bodies of others. The protection 
of bare life in R2P permits exceptions to laws governing state sovereignty, blurs territorial 
distinctions, and grants international bodies the ability to break contractual obligations. Marlowe 
represents the antithesis of bare life, ―wearing my powder-blue suit, with dark blue shirt, tie and 
display handkerchief, black brogues, black wool socks, with dark blue clocks on them‖ (Chandler 
3). Marlowe even refuses to undress at Carmen‘s advances, stating instead ―‗Don‘t make me 
dress you again . . . you and I have to keep on being friends, and this isn‘t the way to do it. Now 
will you dress like a nice little girl?‖ (155). In the Agambenian framework of bareness as it 
relates to sovereignty, Marlowe is the political subject who deals exclusively with representation. 
Marlowe remains wholly bios, nothing but political being, refusing to expose his zoē. While this 
may protect Marlowe to a degree, it also takes away from his power – as he explains, ―for 
twenty-five bucks a day . . . I risk my whole future, the hatred of the cops and of Eddie Mars and 
his pals, I dodge bullets and eat saps, and say thank you very much, if you have any more trouble, 
I hope you‘ll think of me . . . and that makes me a son of a bitch‖ (228). If we consider 
Marlowe‘s obsession with clothing within an Agambenian framework, we can see how Marlowe 
refuses to become homo sacer but also refuses to become the sovereign. Ironically, his clothing 
excludes him from occupying either of the positions of power produced by states of exception. 
When Marlowe enters General Sternwood‘s house at the very start of the novel, he notices a 
stained glass window: ―there was a broad stained-glass panel showing a knight in dark armor 
rescuing a lady who was tied to a tree and didn‘t have any clothes on‖ (Chandler 3). Clothing is 
like armour because it is a protection against bareness, and Marlowe protects himself very well. 
The role of Carmen‘s naked body in The Big Sleep and the bareness of human life in The 
Responsibility to Protect both show how protection can permit the suspension of law. This paper 
takes up Agambenian thought in order to demonstrate the hidden similarity between these two 
texts as it applies to the theme of protection, while also pointing out ways that Agamben‘s 
political theory can be rethought. Although Agamben‘s theorizing of bare life focuses on its 
vulnerability and its subjection to power, bare life – as it is represented by Carmen Sternwood in 
The Big Sleep and human life in R2P – also enables others to become more vulnerable. Sovereign 
power can be extended in order to protect bare life, and ―elaborate smut . . . seemed to mean a lot 
of protection‖ (Chandler 30).   
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